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Abstract 
Due to market imperfections and sexual division of labour, this paper takes interest in gender 
specific values of agricultural labour products (or shadow wages) and the problem of 
aggregating agricultural production activities. The paper analyses two farming systems 
instead of using an aggregated agricultural harvest under the presumption that households are 
restricted in choosing crop patterns and consequently limited in their allocation of labour. The 
farming systems differ in the level of diversification over crops where a limited number of 
households are able to engage in the more diversified system (two crops: rice and sugar cane) 
while other households are restricted to cultivate only one of the two (rice). These 
circumstances are likely to be widespread in developing countries. Since an entry restriction 
limit the choice of crop pattern, production functions for rice and sugar cane are estimated 
separately. We find labour returns to differ significantly between farming systems with lower 
returns for single-crop producers. The paper tests whether non-separability conditions holds 
and find in general that theoretical predictions cannot be falsified. This implies that over the 
whole sample households are on average unable to adjust their labour supply at the margin 
and hence, using shadow wages from an aggregated agricultural production is likely to 
mislead policy conclusions. We also find that diversified household members do equate 
returns between the farming systems while households that are restricted to one production 
activity yield lower returns. Since less diversified households are in general poorer poverty 
alleviation policies must address the entry restriction but first, policy makers should check 
whether they need to redraw policy conclusions made on aggregate harvests.  
 
 




1  Introduction and Background  
Many rural development issues hinge upon how labour returns vary over sex and age. The 
neoclassical understanding of labour supply, schooling, and fertility rely on our information 
on labour products. For example, a higher female productivity increases her opportunity cost 
of rearing children and thus, under the assumption that children are normal goods, the demand 
for children decreases. In many developing countries, labour markets are imperfect and we 
cannot therefore trust the observed market wages as appropriate proxies for labour returns. 
Hence, calculating labour effects is essential for example to make predictions of pro-poor 
policies. There however other market failures that we typically meet when we study economic 
behaviour in developing countries. Other examples might therefore be; credit market failure, 
or failures in the land market. In the presence of market imperfections, we need to ask us 
fundamental questions such as issues pertaining to labour substitutability for example. Early 
econometric studies of labour products assumed perfect substitutability between labour 
categories, see for example Lau, Lin and Yotopoulos (1978). Under many circumstances, this 
is a sensible assumption, but as Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) showed, this is not always a 
valid assumption. They discovered labour heterogeneity and concluded that we need to 
distinguish between hired and family labour since the two labour categories were 
complements. Whenever we suspect that agricultural activities are gender divided, the 
assumption of perfect substitutes might fail. If such sexual labour division is prevalent, Jacoby 
(1992) suggested that also male and female labour is better characterised as being 
complements. In regions where wages are poor proxies for labour returns adequate estimates 
of labour returns can instead be obtained by estimating shadow wages using an agricultural 
production function. In that sense, this paper is a close relative to that of Jacoby (1993), who 
focused on male and female productivity differentials. In his paper, Jacoby used a price 
aggregated production function but in our case, aggregation based on prices might be less  
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suitable due to market imperfections. We argue that under entry restrictions that restrict 
households to a certain market the analysis of labour products and supply would be more 
adequately estimated using separate agricultural production functions. The motivation is 
simple but makes an important case; if a household is not active in a certain market due to 
market imperfections, labour inputs are not substitutes between production possibilities 
simply because households are excluded to that particular market. Therefore, market 
imperfections raise the general question of how we aggregate agricultural production. 
Usually, prices are used to produce a composite output good. But outputs are only possible to 
aggregate if all households participate in all outputs market or if all markets clear. 
  In this paper we hypothesise that: 2) Due to market imperfections it is likely that there 
is a wedge between labour returns between households that are engaged in the diversified 
system as compared to those households that are restricted to only rice. In short, all 
households are not able to allocate their labour at the margin due to market constraints. 
Theory suggests that the two samples have different labour returns. In our case, resource 
constraints (widely defined) imply that relatively well-endowed households are more 
proficient to produce sugar cane. 2) Male and female are not necessarily substitutes. This 
stems partly from the fact that female labour market participation is more restricted than is 
male participation but other explanations of more traditional character including labour 
quality differentials might also be relevant. In this respect we might add intrahousehold power 
distribution to the potential set of explanations under the assumption that the household 
member with decisional power might be able to over-utilise the other member’s labour. 
Taking market imperfections sincerely, has implications on recent literature on labour supply 
which uses shadow wages calculated from an aggregated agricultural production function, see 
Jacoby (1993), Skoufias (1994) and Abdulai and Regmi (2000).  
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  The paper concludes that labour returns of males and females living in diversifying 
households are significantly different from households with a single crop. The paper supports 
suggestions made by a non-separable model and raises questions regarding the aggregation of 
agricultural output into one production function under market imperfections. It seems that in 
this data labour supply in general is backward bending, see Rosenzweig (1980) for a similar 
finding.  
  The paper is organised as follows: the next section present the theoretical model for 
our purposes. Section 3 gives a description of the data set, the sexual labour division, and the 
amount of labour market participation. In section 4 and 5, we present our empirical approach 
and findings. The paper ends by summing up the results and potential policy implications.  
 
2 The  Model 
The model presented below is a modified version of Gronau (1977), edited by Jacoby (1993) 
and later used by Skoufias (1994) and Abdulai and Regmi (2000). First, labour is gender 
specialised implying that labour is heterogeneous and consequently, under this assumption the 
model is non-separable by construction. We do not allow for hired labour, such as in 
Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) but this is likely to be of minor importance  since there are 
only very rare occasions where hired labour is utilised. We extend the non separability with 
an additional constraint that makes households unable to adjust their labour between activities 
at the margin. This constraint tries to resemble a resource constraint faced by poorer 
households that are unable to raise sufficient amounts of funding in order to invest in crop 
diversification. We are not explicitly considering cases where farmers have preferences over 
working on or off-farm as in Lopez (1984).  
Household members allocate their time endowment (Ti) over four activities, leisure 
(Li), home production (Ni), market work (Mi), and farm work (Fi), where the subscript i    
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defines male m or female f. Farm and market work generates income to purchase a market 
composite good X, Home production is described by a well-behaved production function,  
Z =Z (Ni , E, K| h ) where E is a vector of non labour inputs, K is fixed factors and h is 
household or individual characteristics. We are also assuming that Z is perfectly substitutable 
with the market purchased good and in principle with the agricultural commodity as well. The 
latter production is given by a likewise well-behaved function Γ (Fi G, A| h, Y), with G is non-
labour inputs, A the corresponding fixed inputs. Y stands for the minimum required amount of 
exogenous wealth or resources needed to convert or acquire land for sugar cane cultivation. 
There is no hired labour in the model and effective wages within the households might differ 
between market observations Wi and family labour due to general transaction costs. The price 
of the agricultural commodity is set as the numeraire. Households choose X, N, F, M, so as to: 
 
Max U(C, Li  |   h )              ( 1 )  
 
subject to:  
 
C= X+Z            ( 2 a )  
Z =Z (Ni , E, K| h )            ( 2 b )  
X = Γ (Fi G, A| h, Y) – pEE – pGG + WmMm + WfMf  + V      ( 2 c )  
Li + Ni + Fi + Mi =Ti           ( 2 d )  
Mi≥ 0 i  =  m, f            ( 2 e )  
Y ≥ 0              ( 2 f )  
 
After substitution, the above gives the following Lagrangean: 
  
7 
! = U(X+Z, Ti – Ni – Fi – Mi | h) λ [ Γ (Fi G, A| h, Y) – pEE – pGG + WmMm + WfMf  + V– X] + 
µ iMi + ϕ Y  
 
Assuming the household member participates in non-leisure activities we have after some 









































            ( 5 )  
 
The equilibrium, condition (3) implies that households equate their marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure to the relevant shadow wage. There are several 
alternative wage rates in this model depending on what type(s) the household member 
supplies and this is in the essence why we cannot add these production functions and 
construct a full model, households are simply not confined in one and the same sample. First, 
if the member supply labour to all three income-generating activities, both ϕ  and µ i are zero 
as required by the complementary slackness conditions, then consequently the relevant 
shadow wage is equal to Wi, or the market wage for member i. If on the other hand member i 
is engaged only in the cash crop and home production µ >0, ϕ =0, then the shadow wage 
depends on the sizes and signs on the Lagrangean multipliers. The same goes for individuals 
with engagements in home production and market labour but then µ i=0 but instead ϕ !0. In  
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model without the last constraint (2f), δΓ /δ Fi and δ Z/δ Ni would yield the same optimal 
conditions, namely that the marginal product would be equal to one and the same shadow 
wage determined by the complementary slackness condition given by the labour market 
constraint (the Lagrangean multiplier in (2d)).  However, since there is a constraint in 
producing the agricultural cash crop we cannot equate these two marginal products with one 
and the same shadow wage due to the second complementary slackness condition (2f), which 
implies that F and N are not perfect substitutes for households with insufficient Y. The 
differences between (3) or (5) as compared to (4), implies that households without sugar-cane 
are not members of the same sample as households with both agricultural crops. The model 
also implies that among other things we can test the H0 hypothesis that households with both 
sugar cane and rice but no labour market participation enjoy the same returns to labour in both 
production functions but also if households with home production (rice) and market work are 
receiving similar returns from their labour input as market wages. Further tests can be done on 
the inequalities between predicted levels of returns from rice and sugar cane and ongoing 
market wages when households are not participating in the labour market, see Table 1. But 
there is an uncertainty on what market equivalent we should use since members are not 
participating and hence, these tests might be less fruitful.  
 
Table 1 Testable restrictions 
Activity Potential  Tests 
M>0, F>0, N>0  µ =0, ϕ =0 !labour returns (rice &sugar )= market wage 
M>0, F=0, N>0  µ =0, ϕ >0 !labour returns (rice )= market wage 
M=0, F>0, N>0  µ >0, ϕ =0 !labour returns (rice)= labour products (sugar ) 
µ >0, ϕ =0 !labour returns (rice, sugar)≠  market wage (likely) 
M=0, F=0, N>0  µ >0, ϕ >0 !labour returns rice ≠  on going market wage (likely) 
 
The equilibrium conditions above imply a non-separable model, however, assuming the 
household’s budget set is a convex set we can linearise the budget constraint at the optimal  
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point, Moffitt (1990), and there is in fact a set of prices that would induce the household to 
choose this optimal point, and these are the relevant shadow prices. Hence, the slope of the 
tangency point of the household budget constraint is equal to the shadow wage, 
*
i W of which 
empirical counterpart is the appropriate labour return. Using this insight and following the 
methodology developed by Jacoby (1993), we can redefine the household income for 
households with Mi = 0: 
 
V G p E p C Z C V G E Z + − − − + − Γ = Γ } max{ } max{
*       ( 6 )  
 
where C!, and CZ are the associated costs to producing ! and Z.  
  A shadow price induces agents to allocate resources efficiently at optimal points. 
Hence, using shadow prices in the utility maximisation problem above instead would yield a 
standard separable model. However, in our case there is a structural market distortion that 
restrict households to enter the sugar cane market and are therefore limited in their labour 
supply. Consequently, we cannot sum up total labour supply over households since they face 
a different option set over where to allocate their labour. We need instead to estimate two 
separated labour supply functions, one for households with only home production and one for 
households with both cash crop and home cultivation. Both labour supply functions are likely 
to depend on both male and female wage levels. The labour supply for individual i to farming 
system o is: 
 
) | , (




io W is the shadow wage individual i in o = {Z " !, Z}. 
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3   The data  
The information is from a survey conducted during the fourth quarter of 1998
1. It contains 
300 random sampled households spread over three communes, Man Duc, Than Hoi and Tu 
Ne, and ten hamlets. Four observations were deleted due to lack of dependent variables. The 
area is in the hilly district of Tan Lac, Hoa Binh province roughly thirty kilometres southeast 
of Hanoi. The climatic pattern consists of two separate periods: a rainy season between April 
and October and a dry season between November and March. Variations in climate factors 
such as rainfall, temperature are unknown but believed to be small across the sample.  
  In total, there are about 12,500 households in the area of which roughly 11,700 have 
their primary income from agriculture. Two ethnic groups are represented, Kinh and Moung 
of which Moung people are in majority. Rice paddy is the dominating agricultural activity. 
Sugar Cane cultivation is however, the major cash crop. Villages with any significant 
agricultural diversification normally diversify from rice production towards sugar cane 
production or growing perennial crops such as trees for fruit production. 
  Most of the variables are self explanatory, but a few deserve additional information. 
Aggregation of labour for example has been done over gender. In the questionnaire, we asked 
for eight different labour categories of which husband and wife constitute the main inputs 
while the category others is also important. The category others was not explicitly divided 
over gender and we have therefore used the household roster in order to ex post separate them 
into gender classes. 
  Below, in Table 1, we show the descriptive statistics of rice and sugar cane 
production. Irrigation is measured in monetary units and the value is supposed to reflect their 
                                                 
1   The writer is indebted to Dr Tran Thi Que of the Centre for Gender and Sustainable Development in 
Hanoi for supervising the data collection.  
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opportunity cost of irrigating their rice fields. Livestock consists of the value in thousand 
Dongs of the sum all livestock.  
  Whenever we have needed logarithms, we have transformed the variables accordingly 
but in some observations, we noted that inputs were stated as zero and in order not to loose 
too many observations, we added one to the value. This method is used elsewhere in studies 
such as Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987), Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994). The variable 
with most frequent zeros is pesticide use.   
 
Table 2 Agricultural Statistics 
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev  Min   Max 
Rice: Output /year (000 
Dongs) 
2995 1883 500  10800 
        Male  Labour 
(days/month) 
18.8 13.9 0  72.7 
        Female   23.5  16.7  0  98.8 
        Pesticide  (000 
Dongs/year) 
19.4 27.9 0  400 
        Fertilisers (kg)  280.2  231.0  0  2100 
        Irrigation  (000 
Dongs/year)  
75.4 67.3 0  360 
       Capital  (000 
Dongs/year) 
1322.7 2686.1 0  29998 
        Rice Land (m
2) 3323.1  1379  998  10000 
Sugar Cane:  
Output  
2145 3145 200  30000 
Male  Labour  23.9 20.2 5.5  98 
Female  Labour  22.2 19.7 4.6  148 
Pesticides  15.8 28.9 0  240 
Fertiliser  230 646 0  5840 
Capital 14  70.6  0  500 
Livestock (000 Dongs)  2446.1  3149.0  0  20601 
Wealth  (000  Dongs)  12830.9 15396.1 400  133150 
Hhsize  (No)  5.6 1.8 2  12 
Variables with * indicates that they are measured in monetary terms 
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  Whenever prices are missing, we have imputed the village average. In both our 
production functions, we have used the value of production as the dependent variable. In rice 
production there is a small variability in prices of output with mean price 1750 Dongs per 
kilogram. The lowest reported price is 1500 Dongs and the highest is 2000 Dongs. In sugar 
cane production, farmers face the same price.         
  Of roughly 1200 adults, 120 individuals or 10 per cent (of which less than 1 % are 
females) joined the labour market during the present season and then only occasionally. The 
participation is also highly skewed over population centres, with one village within the 
commune of Man Duc, having almost a third of the total participation.  
  A different comparative advantage of males and females that causes men and women 
to be complements implies that we cannot aggregate labour inputs. In order to detect any 
specific sexual labour division we asked the respondents about their particular labour 
responsibilities. Men dominate the more burdensome or riskier activities. Considering the 
potential effects on fertility and child bearing letting the male apply pesticides and 
insecticides might be a reasonable way of dividing risky activities. The domination of males is 
also prevalent if we consider distribution of decisional power -here exemplified by the person 
in control over agricultural investments. Other activities with significant labour division in 
agriculture are planting and weeding.  
 
5   Empirical Strategy 
The general empirical specification is the translog form, which is the empirical matching part 
to Z and Γ in section 2:  
 









= ∑∑ ∑ αβ β
1
2 1
        ( 8 )  
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where Y ~is either Z or Γ , Xi, j are inputs to the production and " and #ij are parameters to be 
estimated.  
  In the rice estimation the inputs are our two labour categories; males and females: Nm 
and Nf that are in the focus of this study besides land, L; irrigation, I; pesticides, P; fertilisers, 
F; and capital, C. These four latter inputs are members in the vector E as seen in the 
theoretical exposition above. There are relatively many households that have reported zero 
inputs -most frequently pesticides and capital. A Boxcox transformation require strictly 
positive values and are therefore not an option but other transformation might come to pass. 
We have tried to construct logged variables with zero skewness
2, Stata (1998) for C and P and 
used these transformed variables in the estimation but this estimation was outperformed 
(measured by Aikakes and Schwartz information criteria) by one in which dummies replaced 
the variables with frequent zeros. In addition to these variables we will add village 
information due reasons outlined above.  
  To fit the sugar cane production we proceeded along the same route and consequently  
attempted a transformed variable estimation but all three inputs in G are frequently reported 
as being zero and consequently, we ran the transformation procedure for all three variables. 
The result was disappointing in that it rendered ridiculous results in returns to the transformed 
variables mounting to a factor thousand of the value put in. Such a result is simply unrealistic. 
We settled therefore to include dummies for capital, pesticides, and fertilisers 
  There is finally an issue related to an endogeniety problem of our independent 
variables when we estimate an agricultural production function. It might be argued that inputs 
are determined simultaneously with output. In that case, the estimates would be inconsistent 
and biased, and hence, we would need to use the instrument variable technique. Two 
                                                 
2 In fact this transformation is just as arbitrarily as adding the value one to the variable which is commonly found 
in the literature, see for example Jacoby (1993). The formula is newvar=ln(oldvar-k) and choosing k using 
Newton’s optimisation method.  
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strategies exist to overcome the dilemma. First, writers argue that farmers (or firms) are 
maximising expected profits and from the results in Zellner et al (1966), OLS estimation will 
then be consistent and unbiased. This requires however that man-made errors are independent 
from natural stochastic events. Alternatively, writers cannot overcome the problem and report 
that their regression is subject to simultaneous bias, see for example Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg (1987). We assume henceforth that farmers maximise expected profits.  
 
6   Empirical Results  
A. Rice 
We start by discussing the rice production, which we have estimated by ordinary least square. 
The estimates of our translog estimation are shown below in Table 3. We detected 
heteroscedasticity and we consequently used the consistent sandwich estimator, White (1980). 
We reject the Cobb-Douglas form [F (16, 269) = 2.26] indicating that this functional form 
might be too restrictive. A Ramsey test of omitted variable showed that we could not reject 
the hypothesis that the estimation has no omitted variables. In order for the production 
function to be homothetic we require that ##ij=0 and for homogeneity of degree one the ##i 
must equal to one. Imposing linear restrictions on the estimates can test whether these two 
qualifications hold. In the present case, we reject that the production function in Table 3 is 







Table 3 Rice Production Estimates 
Variable Estimate Variable    Estimate 




























































Nobs=296, F(26, 269)=34.14. R-sq = .65 
 
We have included four village dummies in our estimation all of which lies within one 
commune Tu Ne. These are, as mentioned above, included to cover for the zero reported 
values in irrigation.  
  The interpretation of the other variable estimates cannot be untangled directly since 
we need to consider the interaction terms as well. If we start with the variables included in E, 
we have found that our returns to factor inputs of land, L and fertilisers Fe are 0.47, and 1.5 
respectively while the elasticity of land is 0.59. This implies that there is a profit to make by 
adding one additional unit of fertiliser and that there are no economies of scale in the 
utilisation of land. Both are marginal effects are declining. These are of minor interest to us in 
the present paper and for expositional brevity we refrain from including any lengthy  
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discussions around them and the rest of this section is devoted to marginal effects from our 
labour inputs. In Table 4, we give the calculated values of the labour returns. The calculations 
of returns to inputs are based on (9), see below
3. The results are in monetary terms since we 















=+ + ∑ 2
        ( 9 )  
where the “hat” depicts predicted values. 
 






Value (thousand dongs) 
Male Labour  3.7 
Female Labour  5.8 
 
There is a relatively high difference between male and female labour implying that female 
labour is more productive than is male labour -in values, 5.8 and 3.7 thousand Dongs per day 
for females and males respectively. The higher relative value of female labour compared to 
female is found elsewhere; see for example Alderman et al (1995). But the result contrasts 
that of Jacoby (1992, 1993), who found higher female products. Obvious explanations of 
different marginal products are quality differentials between male and female labour.   
  If we run a simple regression of labour returns on the size of the rice plot, we find that 
there is a significant and negative correlation between female returns and the size of the rice 
paddy. For male returns, the effect is not as outspoken. Nevertheless, the female effect 
supports the proponents, who argue that farm size and labour returns are negatively 
correlated, see Binswanger et al (1995) for a recent discussion.  
                                                 
The elasticity can be calculated by (9) but including only the function within brackets.   
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B. Sugar Cane 
Our data contains 170 households with a complete description of sugar cane cultivation 
efforts. Our objectives concerns the whole sample, and since only a fraction of the total 
sample of 295 (one additional deleted due to missing values) households produce sugar cane, 
we must raise the question whether or not our sugarcane cultivators represents a random 
sample. It is possible that we are unable to control for all the variables that are a part of the 
farmer’s information set -it also be possible that an unobserved systematic pattern over the 
whole sample is inflicting our farmer’s decision to engage in sugar cane production. Then, we 
suspect that we are confronted with sample selection bias. Under sample selection bias we 
cannot use ordinary least square without getting biased results and we therefore employ the 
Heckman technique when we estimate the sugar cane production function, which correct the 
OLS estimation for potential sample bias, Heckman (1976).  
 
In short, our empirical counterpart of Γ  is given by: 
 
) , , ( ~ h F f i G = Γ ,  
 
where Γ~is the value of sugar cane produced during last year; G depicts the inputs as above; Fi 
is a labour input which in turn is m equal males and f depicts females and finally h is 
household characteristics. The Heckman model is estimated by maximum likelihood and 
based on the following two econometric equations: 
 
   I j j u1
~ + + = Γ β α          regression  model 
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where I={G, Fi, h} 
 
The dependent variable Γ~ is only observed if: 
 




u1∼ N(0, σ ), u2∼ N(0, 1), corr(u2 , u2 ) = ρ  
 
where  z represents the independent parameters giving the probability to be a sugar cane 
producer. The greek letters ", #, $, and %, are being estimated. Error terms are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity by using White (1980) robust errors. The technique is known to be 
sensitive to miss-specification in the selection equation and we have therefore evaluated the 
estimates using different specifications of the probit equation with no significant changes of 
the interesting estimates over different specifications.  
  The factors of production in sugar cane cultivation are mainly male and female labour, 
Fm and Ff, with fertilisers, pesticides and total capital, (F, P and C respectively) as additional 
inputs in the vector I. But as we saw in the case of rice production, we encountered a 
multitude of reported zero values in all three inputs in G.  We attempted therefore to 
transform these variables according to the procedure outlined above but the ML procedure did 
not convert for capital and thus we needed replace capital use with a dummy, dcap. As for the 
other transformed inputs, fertiliser and pesticide, we noted that returns to those were 
exceptionally high and  implied non-declining marginal products on the one hand (fertiliser  
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and pesticides) and a non-monotonic function on the other (female labour).  Relying on our 
subjective judgement, we decided to replace fertiliser, pesticides and capital with dummies. 
  As independent variables in the selection equation, we have included a number of 
variables that is assumed to be essential in the decision of initiating sugar cane cultivation. In 
our theoretical model we argue that there are important resource constraints to impinge 
households from initiating sugar cane production. Most importantly, is the ability to refrain 
from receiving cash flow to the household budged while having invested in a crop that has a 
low output during the first year. Hence, credit constraints which would, if they were non-
existent make available financial resources to overcome the gestation period before the first 
substantial income flow would be generated. In the absence of proper credit markets we are 
likely to find that the wealth level would significantly induce household to initiate crop 
diversification. Hence, the wealth level is included in the selection equation.  
  There are other variables that influence the decision to invest in sugar cane. Labour 
availability is one important case which would be forcefully important since labour is an 
essential ingredient in the production. We proxy the labour availability with the size of the 
household. Above we touched upon the importance of ethnicity and it was indicated that 
ethnic belonging might affect which crops the households decide to cultivate. Therefore, 
ethnicity is included in the participation equation and takes the value one if the households are 
Moung people and zero if they are Kinh. In the participation equation we have finally 
included measures of male and female rice labour productivities since increasing productivity 
in rice production would be favourable for other farming systems. We have also elaborated 
with communal and village dummies and in our final estimation, we have added a dummy for 
the Tu Ne commune. In the quest of replacing this dummy with something more 
informational we tried various village and communal characteristics without being support it  
20 
with a likelihood ratio test. In Table 5, we give the sample selection estimation of sugar cane 
production.  












Female labour [F]  -0.63 
(0.5) 
Land [L]  0.06* 
(0.04) 
M × M -0.02 
(03) 
F × F -0.04 
 (0.03) 
L × L 0.11* 
(0.6) 
M × F   -0.07 
(0.05) 
M ×  L  -0.09 
(0.07) 
F ×  L  .16** 
(0.07) 
Dummy Fertiliser  .23* 
(.12) 
Dummy Capital  0.02 
(0.09) 
Dummy pesticides   0.1 
(0.1) 











Agricultural Land  -0.000001** 
(2.9e-6) 
Ethnic belonging  -0.86** 
(0.2) 
Male productivity rice  0.003 
(0.002) 
Female productivity rice  0.01** 
(0.002) 








Tot Nobs 295 Uncensored 170; Ll=  300.6; Chi2 (13)=266.1  
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First, let us briefly look at the participation results. We find that most variables are significant 
at five per cent. When we ran the probit in isolation, it received a pseudo R-square of 0.125. A 
dummy for Tu Ne was included to capture any bias in reporting from the commune, see 
above. Our indicator of labour availability is positive and significant. This indicates that larger 
households are more likely to invest in sugar cane production. There is a relatively large and 
positive correlation between household size and the wealth level. But other measures of 
labour availability such as the number of adults or males are even more correlated and the use 
of household size can therefore be supported. If households belong to the Moung tribe, they 
are less likely to cultivate sugar cane. It is known that Moung preferably live further away 
from roads and consequently, they do not have equal access to economic opportunities (such 
as investments in sugar cane activities) as Kinh people have. Our effort to include labour 
productivities was successful as both male and female labour productivity is significant. The 
positive sign must be considered as expected. A higher productivity in rice makes labour 
available for other activities and therefore, households with a higher productivity have an 
increased opportunity to diversify to other farming systems.  
  Finally, there is a strong and positive significant effect from the level of wealth 
acquired within the household. If the household is wealthy it is more likely to invest in the 
diversified crop system. We argue that this effect would not be strong under conditions 
resembling a well functioning credit market since then, household would be able to lend 
sufficient funds to diversify. This impact supports our theoretical argument to seriously 
consider any potential market constraint that restricts household from investing in 
diversification.  
    
22 
ii) Regression analysis 
As in the estimation of the rice cultivation, we cannot detect the marginal effects directly but 
must disentangle them by using (9) above. We tested for homogeneity of degree one but 
rejected this at 2% level. Homotheticity is not rejected at any conventional significance level. 
Our estimation of sugar cane production inhibits decreasing returns of scale of about 0.62. 
The dummy for labour cropping cycle is found to be significant and with a negative sign and 
it controls for the particular stage the farmer is under the three-year cropping cycle of sugar 
cane. 
  Thus, given the functional form, the estimates do not show marginal impacts and we 
need therefore to calculate them using  (9) above. When we take the relevant derivative, we 
get the monetary value of the marginal product since the left hand-side is given in monetary 
units. The calculated marginal product of male labour is, evaluated at sample means, 13.3 
thousand Dongs per day, see Table 6, female labour is 4.4 thousand Dongs per day, and the 
difference cannot however be statistically verified. At the individual level, a t-test indicates 
that both values are statistically equal to the reported average wage rate (about 13 thousand 
Dongs per day) which implies that the female value in Table 6 is perhaps somewhat 
misleading.  
 






Male Labour  13.3 
 




C. Testing theoretical restrictions 
  We can now test the implications of the theoretical model above found in Table 1. 
Simple  t-tests can reveal whether shadow returns from households with the diversified 
farming system can equate labour returns between the two crops, and it is found that we 
cannot reject equality at 5 per cent between male and female returns between our two 
production functions, see Table 7.  
 





Restrictions / Tests 
M>0, F>0, N>0                   µ =0, ϕ =0 [A]!( f F W Z
f = )                    Not rejected  
                                [B]!(  m F W Z
m = )                   Not rejected  
                                [C]!( f N W
f = Γ )                     Not Rejected 
                                [D]!( m m W = Γ )                     Not rejected  
                                [E]! (
f f F N Z = Γ )                  Not rejected 
                                [F]!( 
m m F N Z = Γ )                  Not rejected 
M>0, F>0, N=0                   µ =0, ϕ >0 [G]!( f F W Z
f = )                   Not rejected [small] 
                                [H]!( m F W Z
m = )                   Not Rejected  
M=0, F>0, N>0                  µ >0, ϕ =0 [I] !(
f f F N Z = Γ )                  Rejected [
f f F N Z > Γ ] 
                                [J] !(
m m F N Z = Γ )                  Rejected [
m m F N Z > Γ ] 
      
One test was conducted with less than ten observations (noted small within the square 
brackets). Hence, this results might be unreliable and we are therefore unable to state anything 
firm about the test [G]. Most of the other tests in Table 7 are in agreement of the theoretical 
suggestions from section 2. It seems therefore that the model is a reasonable description of 
their economic environment. However, the rejection of tests [I] and [J] suggests that males on 
farms with a diversified farming system and zero market labour are unable to equate their 
labour returns between rice and sugar cane. If we can trust our estimates it implies that our 
theoretical model might be unfit to arrest what seems as a restriction within the sugar cane  
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market leading to households with the diversified crop system supplying too little labour to 
sugar cane. There are a number of potential motivations to this behaviour. First, it might be 
the case that the marginal return is highly non-linear with some threshold of labour input if 
which overridden, leads to negative returns. This had to be combined with a shortage of land 
and or a lack of additional resources which restricts land use change to sugar cane. We cannot 
find support for a highly non-linear return function this but it is still an open question. 
Another potential explanation in support for this inequality might be a limit in the land 
suitable for sugar cane in combination with a constraint in the rice market which would force 
household to keep producing rice for domestic use. There is however an existing market for 
rice and we can therefore rule out that as a suitable explanation. To find an appropriate 
empirical explanation more research is needed. Theoretically, however, we could construct 
additional constraints which would describe the situation but it would be complicated 
empirically and out of reach of estimation using the existing data. This result suggests that 
aggregating labour input without serious concern about market surroundings is indeed 
problematic and might lead to severely biased estimates the labour supply function. More 
fundamentally, households with the less diversified system have significantly lower returns 
from labour than compared with households with the diversified system. These findings are 
also consistent with the arguments presented in section 2 and provides an strong support 
against aggregating agricultural production since market imperfections limit households in 
their effort to allocate labour efficiently.  
 
D. Estimating Labour Supply 
In our analysis of labour supply, the theoretical model above calls for estimates of individual 
shadow wages and household income V
* which estimate is given by (6). The setting prohibits  
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to estimate the labour supply using the whole sample. The empirical counterpart to (7), is 
specified in log-linear form as: 
 
m mh vm f fm m m m mo
f fh vf m mf f f f fo
h V W W R
h V W W R
ε β β β β α
ε β β β β α
+ + + + + =
+ + + + + =
* * * *
* * * *
ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
      ( 1 2 )  
 
where α  and β  are parameters to be estimated. Given that variables are in logarithmic values 
the estimates β f,m shows the uncompensated own wage elasticity and β ij {i, j=m, f} gives the 
uncompensated cross-wage elasticity for male and female respectively. Last, β vi shows the 
estimate of household income elasticity for male and female labour supply. We cannot utilise 
our calculated shadow wages in our estimation of male and female labour supply directly 
since these are not exogenous to 
*
io R and we have subsequently used the IV technique and 
incorporate the predicted values of respective shadow wage in each of the labour supply 
functions.  
Table 8 Labour Supply Functions 
Variable Male  Lab.  Supply 
Sugar Cane 
Heckit IV 
Female Lab Supply  























































































*, ** implies significance at 10 and 5 per cent resp. 
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The instruments used are differently to those in h of the estimation of 
*
io R . The choice of 
household characteristics rely to a great extent on Jacoby (1993 and Skoufias (1994). We have 
also tested for the number of kids in rearing age within the family under the assumption that 
this would decrease the amount of labour supplied, especially females’, but this had no impact 
on our estimations. The variables included are seen in Table 7 
  First, there is a general trend of negative estimates on own uncompensated wage 
levels, which implies that the respective labour supply curve is backward bending similar to  
Rosenzweig (1980). This means that the income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
There is also a significant discrepancy between different point estimates from the two samples 
we are analysing and this shows that the uncompensated wage elasticities are not equal across 
samples.   
  Cross wage effects are not statistically significant in three out of four cases and we are 
consequently hesitant to agree with Skoufias (1994) who claim that studies that restrict cross 
wage effects to zero are necessarily subject to specification error, it seems that it depends very 
much on the actual setting. One estimate of the household income effects different from zero 
and suggest that in terms of utility, leisure is not a normal good. The other estimates are not 
verified however. 
  Continuing in more detail  with the estimates of males labour supply from households 
with the diversified farming system (second column to the right), we see that male 
uncompensated wage elasticity is -.71 and indicating as mentioned above, a supply curve that 
is backward bending. Males from wealthy households does not seem to be affected to work 
less and a significant cross-elasticity from female uncompensated wage suggests that within 
these households, male and female leisure are compliments but note that this is the only 
significant effect from cross-effects over the four estimations. The corresponding female 
supply curve shows a similar tendency but with no significant effects from either male or  
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female shadow wage. Some differences are worth mentioning though. First, is the positive 
impact from households with disabled members. It implies that females work more, if at least 
one member of the household has a physical disability. Secondly, there is a significantly 
stronger effect from the wealth level of the household indicating that female from wealthier 
households tend to work less. We also find a positive effect from the household income level.  
  A considerable share of the predicted values of shadow wages were below zero. In 
both male and female supply functions the own uncompensated wage effect is significant and 
negative, but also significantly different as compared to the previous estimation. The own 
wage elasticity for males is slightly lower than previously while it is higher in the case of 
female labour supply. The income effect is positively different from zero but not statistically 
verified in the both rice labour equations and this suggests that leisure for these males is again 
not a normal good. It is difficult to state anything general other that the labour- supply curves 
tend to be backwards bending and potential explanations might include such as Skoufias 
(1994) who referred to the “broadness” of the dependent variable and that we should not be 
surprised of a backward bending supply curves since the number of activities included on the 
endogenous side is large and contains presumably homework, market-, and farm-work. This is 
not the case here however even though the time spent on these activities constitute the bulk of 
time spent on productive activities.  
 
7 Conclusions 
We have analysed households with different farming systems. We have shown that under 
market imperfections, we cannot easily aggregate agricultural production since households are 
unable to adjust resource use at the margin. The main finding of different shadow wages 
across farming systems has implications on a wider literature and casts doubts over recent 
estimates of labour supply functions using aggregated agricultural production. Since sugar  
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cane producers seem to receive higher returns, the question is why don’t more farmers enter 
the sugar cane market? There are two potential constraints. One concerns the land market 
where land is considered to be scarce. Second, even though credits are available, it is the 
relatively wealthier households that engage in both the diversified farming system and poorer 
households are not able to invest in both sugar cane and rice production due to lack of 
available resources. We have investigated the model’s implications on male and female labour 
supply and found significant differences between the two samples as suggested by the 
theoretical model. Under these circumstances, we need to realise the implications from 
imperfect markets and any conclusions on models that do not consider these market 
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